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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORG-E C. l\IAW, W. EUGENE ) ~LA\V, ORLO S. MAW and FER-
HELL J. l\IAW, R. JOHN MAW 
and JUNIOR B. MAW, VIRGIL 
G. :\L~ \V and V ADEL T. MAW, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants~_ c· 'IN 
, lVI 0. 
vs. I 9950 
,. 
\VEBER BASIN WATER CON- .,._ 
SERYANCY DISTRICT and 
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah 
Corporation, 1-.~ Defendants-Respondents. _-
APPELL~TS' REPLY BRIEF 
Because of two major areas of argument contained 
in Respondent's brief which appellants contend are in-
accurate, misleading and contrary to the record, appel-
lants submit this reply brief in order that the Court 
will have the true picture of what happened at the pre-
trial proceedings before it. 
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ARGUMENT. 
I. PLAINTIFFS WERE DENIED TilE 
OPPORTUNIT-Y OF PUTTING ON EVI-
DENCE ON ALL ISSUES EXCEPT EVI-
DENCE RELATING TO THE 1936 AGREE-
MENT. 
On Pages 4, 19 an~. ?O of respondent's brief the 
contention is raised with references· to the transcript, 
that the Court repeatedly offtred to permit plaintiffs 
to put on evidence in support of their position. On 
the face of such an ·argument such a broad generali-
zation might appear logical, but the references in re-
spondents' brief and the quotations containing discus-
sions between the Court and· counsel for appellants 
have been taken out of context. Because of this a word 
of explanation is in order. 
At the pre-trial hearing of February 14, 1963, the 
Court first addressed its analysis of the situation as to 
whether or not appellants had a cause of action against 
the Ogden Duck Club, and it proceeded to analyze 
that portion of the case first. 0 bviously, since the lia-
bility against the Ogden Duck Club rested in a large 
measure on an interpretation of the 1936 Agreement 
between Annie C. Maw and the Ogden Duck. Club, it 
was necessary to fully exa1nine the Agreement. As to 
the Agreement appellants have stated· that they were 
not in a position, after the lapse of m~ny years, to pro· 
duce evidence. which would alter or explain the meaning 
of that document other than as the conduct of the vari· 
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ous litigants would tend to interpret it over a series 
of years. In fact, .n-Ir. Skeen and other counsel for 
respondents raised an issue of law as to whether, if 
attempted, such evidence could be introduced (Tr. 17). 
To this approach counsel for appellants agreed, rely-
ing upon the ambiguity contained within the four cor-
ners of the instrument and the course of conduct of the 
parties over the years to explain that ambiguity. 
It is true, as has been referred to by respondent 
in its references to various portions of the transcript, 
the appellants declined at each point when the matter 
was raised to put on evidence which would tend to vary 
the meaning of the 1936 Agreement other than the type 
of eddence just referred it. However, appellants at no 
paint declined to put on evidence of its other theories 
of the case_, and particularly evidence relating to its 
claims against the Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District! 
It was not until the conclusion of the pre-trial pro-
ceedings on the day involved that the Court finally 
turned its attention to the Weber Basin Water Con-
servancy District, and after a short discussion sum-
marily dismissed the action against it. The bulk of the 
discussion at the pre-trial hearing was concerned with 
the Ogden Duck Club. And the references made by 
respondents to the brief and the Court's offer to permit 
plaintiffs to put on evidence relating to a different mean-
ing which might be given the 1936 Agreement all re-
lated to the claim against the Ogden Duck Club. 
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THE COURT: The court will invite the 
Plaintiff at this time, if they choose to do so, to 
present evidence which would give to this docu-
ment, Exhibit A., some special or unusual mean-
ing. (Tr. 39). 
It was not until page 44 of the transcript that the 
Court got around to discussing the matter of the lia-
bility of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District. 
This can best be illustrated by references to the very 
transcript involved. 
MR. FULLER: No, not necessarily. We 
proceeded against the Weber Basin on the estop-
pel theory and the contract theory as well. 
THE COURT: We will get to that in a min-
ute. (Tr. 42). 
* * * * 
THE COURT: I will let the Defendant club 
out of the lawsuit. Let me talk about the Weber 
Basin just a little bit, and make certain I have 
got this straight now . . . ( Tr. 44) . 
When respondents claim that "the Court offered 
to impanel the jury and to hear the evidence in supp~rt 
of the appellants' position, and each time the offer was 
refused . . . , '' they are simply trying to confuse the 
matter by lifting a limited portion of the Pre-trial 
hearing out of context, and attempting to apply it to the 
entire lawsuit. 
II. THE COURT WAS ADVISED OF 
PLAINTIFFS' THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
AT THE PRE-TRIAL STAGE. 
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As indicated in a quotation in the preceding point 
of /ugument, the Court was advised at the Pre-trial 
bearing by appellants' counsel that action was taken 
against the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District 
" .. on the estoppel theory and contract theory as well." 
l•'urther, after the Court finished its discussion relating 
l(J the liability of the Ogden Duck Club at page 44 of 
the trancript, the Court was fully advised of appellants' 
position when discussions relating to the liability of 
the 'V eber Basin Water Conservancy District took 
place: 
THE COURT: What is your theory? 
MR. FULLER: Well, our theory is this, the 
theory is exactly this, before the Maws would 
sell these lands or Val (Or lo) Maw in particular, 
you were President of W. John Maw & Sons 
Company, weren't you? 
MR. VAL (ORLO) lVIAW: Yes. 
~IR. FULLER: Entered into a series of ne-
gotiations and these hunting rights were spelled 
out very clearly to the negotiators for the Weber 
Basin District and Orlo Maw steadfastly re-
fused to sign and sell the land involved without 
the Duck Club's shooting privileges for himself 
and other members of the family being settled. 
I-Iis testimony would be that he insisted that he 
get assurance in the form that he did from Mr. 
Fjeldsted's letter before he would sign and sell 
the lands, otherwise, he would have insisted that 
they condemn all of the property rights the Maws 
had inclu~ing the large tract of land, and that 
upon getting these assurances and in discussions 
he had with ·who, you talked with who, Mr. 
Skeen"? 
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MR. ORLO MAW: Concerning these rights, 
Mr. Ed. Skeen. Yes. 
MR. FULLER: What about Mr. George 
Smith, their appraiser1 
MR. ORLO MAW: Mr. George Smith, their 
appraiser, we talked at length with him. 
MR. FULLER: Anyway, as a result of this, 
in order to purchase the land without a condem-
nation suit that was the' arrangement that was 
made. Had there been a condemnation suit, these 
hunting rights would have been brought into the 
matter. (Tr. 47}. 
* * * * 
MR. MAW: They informed me that by pre-
paring this letter to protect all rights which I 
had no right to sell, that we would avoid a con-
demnation suit by proceeding with the con-
tract and I refused to sign the contract until the 
protection, and all of us concerned were given 
protection and as a result the letter was pre-
pared before I signed the contract. Otherwise, 
I would have let it go in the condemnation. (Tr. 
51}. 
The foregoing simply refutes the bold assertion 
made by respondents at page 19 of their brief when they 
say: "No argument of the Third-Party beneficiary 
theory was made to the trial court." 
As further support to the fact that the Court at 
Pre-trial was fully aware of the contentions against the 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, we should 
have a closer look at the record. From the index of the 
record one can readily see that pre-trial proceedings 
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occurred on November 5, 1962, on December 19, 1962, 
and on February 14, 1963. At the Pre-trial hearing 
on November 5, 1962, the Court requested plaintiffs 
to submit a statement of its legal theories against the 
two defendants by December 10, 1962, so that a further 
Pre-trial hearing could be had in the matter. Accord-
ingly, on the date set for the second pre-trial hearing 
on December 10, 1962, there was filed in the matter 
(R. 30) the statement requested by the Court, which 
set forth very clearly the theories of recovery which 
plaintiffs would advance as to each defendant. Because 
of the suggestion that there were new matters before 
the Court, we take the liberty of printing that portion 
of the Record at this time in its entirety: 
PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF LEGAL 
THEORIES AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 36819 
Dept. No.2 
In this action, the plaintiffs will proceed 
against the respective defendants under both 
contract and tort theories, as follows: 
AS TO OGDEN DUCK CLUB 
Contract theory-! t will be the position of 
plaintiffs that the right-of-way agreement (Ex-
hibit "A" of plaintiffs' complaint) has been in 
continuous force and effect notwithstanding the 
construction of the Willard Bay Reservoir Proj-
~ct, and that said Ogden Duck Club wrongfully, 
illegally and unlawfully breached said agreement 
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by refusing to permit plaintiffs to use the facili-
ties of the Ogden Duck Club as provided in said 
agreement. 
This theory will be supported by the right-
of-way agreement attached to the complaint and 
by the land purchase contract between the Maws 
and the United States of America wherein it 
was recognized and agreed in Paragraph 3 a as 
follows: 
"It is understood and agreed that the rights 
to be conveyed to the United States as described 
in Article 3 hereof shall be free from lien or en-
cumbrance except: (ii) rights-of-way for roads, 
(Including the right-of-way granted to the Og-
den Duck Club across Tract 95), ... " 
AS TO WEBER BASIN WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
Contract theory - Plaintiffs will proceed 
against this defendant pursuant to what it con-
ceives to be a valid contract wherein it agreed 
to settle a portion of its claim with the United 
States of America, which is allied with the Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District in the Wil-
lard Bay Project, upon the condition and subject 
to the representations made by the Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District through its man-
ager, E. J. Fjeldsted, that plaintiffs would be 
reimbursed for their "Duck Club shootihg privi-
leges" if they, and the people associated with 
them, would proceed to settle their claims for the 
actual lands involved with the United States of 
America. 
The basis for the aforesaid contract claim 
is set forth in 1\tlr. Fjeldsted's letter toW. John 
10 
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~Iaw and Sons, Inc., dated July 5, 1957, set 
forth in the complaint as Exhibit "B". 
Estoppel - Plaintiffs will proceed against 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District under 
tort claiming an estoppel against defendant We-
ber Basin Conservancy District in that the afore-
said letter, Exhibit ''B", wherein Mr. Fjeldsted 
promised to separately settle with plaintiffs and 
their representatives and associates from the 
"Duck Club shooting privileges" if they would 
settle their other claims with the United States 
of America. Plaintiffs will contend that this rep-
resentation was relied upon by them and that 
they did rely upon the same in settling their 
other claims, that Mr. Fjeldsted acted for and 
on behalf of said defendant and in writing said 
letter (Exhibit "B") he intended that plaintiffs 
rely and act upon said letter, as they did, and 
that plaintiffs suffered damages by reason of the 
refusal of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District to make good upon its representations. 
Trespass-Plaintiffs will further proceed 
against the Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District in tort on the theory that, pursuant to 
their agreement with the United States of 
America, they still retain the rights across their 
lands, even though the route has been changed, 
to supply the Ogden Duck Club with a route 
whereby it can cross said lands to its present 
facilities. Plaintiffs will contend that the fact 
that the Ogden Duck Club was required to move 
its buildings some distance by reason of the 
construction of the Willard Bay Reservoir does 
not, in any way, relieve either defendants from 
accounting to plaintiffs for the use of a re-routed 
road serving the Ogden Duck Club facilities in-
11 
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asmuch as the new road still must traverse the 
same properties which the Maws originally 
owned albeit the route deviates somewhat from 
the former route. 
As an alternative to any argument which 
can be, or which might be, advanced by either 
defendant, to the effect that a new route is being 
used through the same properties, plaintiffs will 
proceed against Weber Basin Water Conserv-
ancy District on the ground and theory that it 
deliberately and without legal or justification 
trespassed upon the original route used by the 
Ogden Duck Club and destroyed it and caused 
it to be covered with water, dikes and other facili-
ties so that it cannot ever be used again. 
* * * * 
It is submitted that the action of the de-
fendants as generalized in the foregoing legal 
theories of recovery has, in effect, constituted 
a complete taking equivalent to a condemnation 
of the full value of the rights in the properties 
which plaintiffs enjoyed, and that the reasonable 
fair cash market value of their rights constitutes 
the measure of damages in this action. 
(It. 30-33) 
Respectfully submitted, 
I sl Glen E. Fuller 
Glen E. Fuller 
15 East Fourth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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How could the contentions of plaintiffs be spelled 
out more clearly than in the foregoing statement? 
CONCLUSION 
It is again submitted that ~hese appellants were 
denied the opportunity of putting on evidence which 
would develop their theories of recovery in this matter, 
and that the procedure used by the Court to dismiss 
the action was contrary to law and justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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